The MOQ and Time
by
Anthony McWatt
The concepts of change[i] and time are not discussed
in Pirsig’s published work though as these underlie the
evolving nature of static patterns in the MOQ, it’s important
their position in the system is clarified. In this appendix,
then, we will examine change, sensed time and the two key
theories of mathematical time elucidated by Newton and Einstein.
The latter are differentiated from sensed time in reference
to Northrop’s concepts by intuition and postulation and
the popular work of Stephen Hawking[ii] and John Barrow.
As elucidated in Chapter Two, logical priority
in the MOQ is given to Dynamic Quality before all
intellectual concepts. This includes ‘time’ as Pirsig (1997d)
illustrates:
It’s important to keep all ‘concepts’ out
of Dynamic Quality. Concepts are always static. Once they
get into Dynamic Quality they’ll overrun it and try to present
it as some kind of a concept itself. I think it’s better
to say that time is a static intellectual concept that is
one of the very first to emerge from Dynamic Quality. That
keeps Dynamic Quality concept-free…
The MOQ starts with the source of undifferentiated
perception itself as the ultimate reality. The very first
differentiation is probably ‘change’. The second one may
be ‘before and after’. From this sense of ‘before and after’
emerge more complex concepts of time.
In the MOQ, therefore, ‘time’ and ‘change’
are intellectual static patterns which are often thought
of (in some interpretations of experience such as Newton’s)
as having an independent, objective existence. If change
is illusory the logical primacy of Dynamic Quality (in the
MOQ) would not be affected.
The evolution described in the MOQ exists
within static patterns only. There is no evolution in Dynamic
Quality. With Dynamic Quality there is no contradiction
and no agreement. Contradiction and agreement are functions
of static intellectual patterns. (Pirsig, 1998c)
Nevertheless, as the idea of cosmological
evolution is an important component of the MOQ, if the process
of change was illusory this would throw doubt on the viability
of Pirsig’s system as a moral framework i.e. without change,
evolution couldn’t occur and, therefore, no moral hierarchy
could be developed employing evolutionary criteria. The
ontological status of change will, therefore, be explored
in the next section.
As apparent from the above, Pirsig perceives
the concept of time as a sophisticated development of the
concept of change. The difficulty with change as a basis
for a definition of time is that (since the era of the Ancient
Greeks) doubts have been put forward concerning its ontological
status. Certainly, from the static viewpoint of
the MOQ, modern scientific evidence strongly indicates that
physical reality (from the quantum level upwards) does continually
alter and that even language and ideas seem rarely to survive
without modification especially over periods of hundreds
or thousands of years. Chaucer (c.1382) understood this
and his Middle English is now a literal illustration of
his point:
Ye
knowe eek, that in forme of speche is chaunge
With-inne
a thousand yeer, and wordes tho
That
hadden prys, now wonder nyce and straunge
Us
thinketh hem; and yet they spake hem so.
For Pirsig, the changing particulars are secondary
to the constant underlying reality of Quality which, like
Plato’s Good, is the primary reality where truth though
important for discovering knowledge (about the Good) is
secondary.[iii]
‘It is the cause of knowledge and truth; and so, while you
may think of it as an object of knowledge, you will do well
to regard it as something beyond truth and knowledge and,
as precious as these both are, of still higher worth.’
(Plato, c.393 B.C., Book VI, Chapter XXIV, para.508) However,
the difference between Pirsig and Plato is that the constant
and non-constant are integrated in the MOQ while Plato divides
the changing particulars of empirical reality (such as horses)
from the Forms (such as horse-ness).
Philosophologists[iv] sometimes try to identify the MOQ with
Plato but Plato considers the Good to be a subspecies
of form[v] while the MOQ considers form to be a
subspecies of Good. That is a huge difference. (Pirsig,
2001d)
I would suggest that as evolutionary theory
shows even ‘horse-ness’ changes over millions of years and
is never constant, it’s the Dynamic element of reality that
is more fundamental than the static one.
Moreover, without change, it’s difficult to
understand the appearance of biological life from inorganic
matter or how it evolved further into the intellectual and
social patterns that exist today. From the perspective
of comparing the universe at the time of the ‘Big Bang’
to now, it does appear plausible to believe that reality
has continually altered. It seems even contradictory to
state an objection to the reality of change as it changes
one state of affairs to another i.e. no objection
at t1 to an objection at t2. As noted in Chapter
Two, one famous example of such an objection comes from
Parmenides which is examined next.
Parmenides’ belief that reality is changeless
relies on the assumption that non-being is impossible
and, therefore, being must be necessary and always
exists. If being always exists then it can neither
come into existence nor out of it. If a property (of something)
cannot cease to come into being or begin to come
into being, then change must be unreal as change
depends on properties coming into and disappearing from
being. However, Parmenides’ reasoning contradicts his own
theory. His theory depends on the assumption that non-being
is impossible yet there was a time before he thought of
his theory when it was in a state of non-being.
It subsequently changed to a state of being
when he thought of it. Therefore, his theory could not
have come into existence without there being change.
From the standpoint of contemporary physics,
the Parmendians [sic] were right to claim a distinction
between appearance and reality but wrong in their claim
where the illusion lies. What is illusory is constancy,
not change. (Di Santo & Steele, 1990, p.160)
Clark (1999) argues that Parmenides’ theory
concerning change could be an absolute truth (having the
same ontological status as a Platonic form): ‘If true, always
true’ and, therefore, existing before Parmenides discovered
it. However, there still was change in Parmenides
conscious mind from not having the theory (that change is
illusory) to having this theory. Moreover, it appears that
Parmenides is conflating a description of reality (i.e.
being) that by definition can’t cease to exist with
reality itself and is, therefore, begging the question in
the first place.
On the other hand, from the Dynamic sense
of the MOQ, Parmenides is, strictly speaking, correct as
the concept of ‘change’ is an abstraction from Dynamic Quality
and, therefore, (as with anything abstracted) doesn’t exist
in an absolute sense. Possibly, the koan-like theories
of Parmenides and Zeno indicate (and they may have shared
similar thinking to Zen masters for such verbal conundrums)
the error of assigning absolute truth to a static concept
when reality is fundamentally dynamic.
Nevertheless, though change may not be an
absolute, it is a ‘concept by intuition’ (as understood
by Northrop)[vi] and seems
more fundamental than even the ‘I’ given in Descartes’ ‘cogito
ergo sum.’ As far as the related concept of time is concerned,
Northrop (1947, p.196) elucidates the important distinction
between ‘sensed time’ and ‘mathematical time’:
Newton, in the Scholium at the beginning
of his Principia, points out that sensed time and sensed
space (i.e., denoted by concepts by intuition) are not to
be confused with ‘true or mathematical’ time or space (i.e.,
designated by concepts by postulation) with which physics
is concerned. One reason for the difference is that whereas
the time of physical theory is postulated as flowing uniformly,
the time given to the senses flows unevenly. He goes on
to add that anyone who confuses the two is guilty of a vulgar
ignorance.
Northrop (1947, p.86) notes that Newton’s
employment of concepts by intuition and postulation in the
context of time is continued by Einstein:
Recently, Albert Einstein has replaced
Newton’s postulates for mechanics with a different
set. But in Albert Einstein’s theory the same distinction
exists between postulated time which flows ‘equably’ and
sensed time which flows non-uniformly. Thus, contemporary
as well as traditional modern physics distinguishes between
concepts by intuition and concepts by postulation and formulates
its theory in terms of the latter.
This type of conceptual division is supported
by the psychologist William Friedman (1990, p.5) who notes
a historical differentiation between sensed concepts of
time and absolute notions of time:
Much of the history of the philosophy of
time is a series of attempts to find time’s essence, whether
in nature or in consciousness. Among those conceptions
tying time to the physical world, time has been defined
as motions, as the succession of events, and as an absolute,
universal framework. Mentalist definitions refer to the
perception of succession and simultaneity or the succession
of ideas in consciousness.
Yet, despite Newton’s and Einstein’s apparent
realisation that the term ‘time’ refers to two (or more)
distinct contexts, Friedman (1990, p.5) observes there still
remains a ‘common tendency’ to treat time as a single entity:
Perhaps the fact that we have a single
word for time has seduced us into searching for its essence.
However, at least from a psychological point of view, it
seems far more productive to consider the many things that
time is, in the world, and the many ways in which human
beings experience it.
A concept by intuition is always known through
direct perception. Examples of concepts by intuition are
sounds, smells, (perceived) colours, pains, pleasures and
sensed time. Though it is possible to judge the passing
of sensed time by immediately perceptible changes (such
as hunger or the position of the sun) it flows non-uniformly.
For instance, a prison sentence might go very slowly at
the time yet, retrospectively, seem very quick (maybe due
to the relatively lack of interesting events) while an enjoyable
holiday might fly past at the time yet seem much slower
when looking back (maybe due to the relative abundance of
exciting events); the memory of experience seemingly prone
both to contraction and expansion.
If (biological) evolution had taken another
path, it seems possible that sensed time for human beings
would now be quite different. For instance, if temperatures
drop only slightly above zero, cold blooded animals such
as crocodiles and tortoises lose the ability to see movement;
a hummingbird flying past is not visible to them. A human
being can see the hummingbird though its wings aren’t perceivable
while a falcon, whose sense of time passes relatively more
slowly, can see the hummingbird’s wings.[vii]
Moreover, it seems apparent that the usual limits of temporal
awareness for human beings depend on body temperature and
can be altered with the increase or decrease of certain
chemicals. It has been noticed in humans that an increase
of adrenaline production slows the passage of sensed time
so that in times of danger there is an increased ability
to act. Undoubtedly, this is why people involved in car
accidents or other life threatening situations talk about
‘time slowing down.’ In addition, there is anecdotal evidence
that artificial chemicals such as LSD and cannabis affect
temporal awareness.[viii] Though, it can be assumed that sensed
time (outside the use of drugs) has remained, more or less,
constant for all human beings this is now open to radical
change via genetic manipulation.
Gorman & Wessman (1977, p.44) trace the
critical biological advance for temporal awareness in human
beings to the development of a bigger brain; particularly
an increase in the frontal association areas of the cerebral
cortex.
The evolutionary development of the brain…
appears to be a necessary substrate for man’s advanced temporal
awareness. Marked advances in cranial capacity occurred
sometime during the past million years, possibly earlier,
according to the fossil evidence.
This temporal awareness was, no doubt, reinforced
by patterns in nature such as night & day and the cycle
of the four seasons.
3.2.
NEWTON’S MATHEMATICAL TIME
Derived from (and logically posterior to)
the concepts by intuition are ‘concepts by postulation.’
A concept by postulation refers to entities and relations
known only through formal or scientific investigation.
‘A concept by postulation is one the meaning of which in
whole or part is designated by the postulates of some specific
deductively formulated theory in which it occurs’. (Northrop,
1947, p.62) Concepts by postulation include substance,
causation, subjects, objects, static value patterns, seconds,
minutes, hours[ix] and phlogiston.[x] ‘Mathematical time’ is also a concept
by postulation; the two major ‘mathematical’ constructions
of time being Newton’s idea of ‘absolute time’ and Einstein’s
idea of ‘relative time’.
According to Hawking (2001, p.32), Newton produced
the first mathematical model for space and time in 1687’s
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica.[xi]
In Newton’s model, time and
space were a background in which events took place but which
weren’t affected by them. Time was separate from space
and was considered to be a single line, or railroad track,
that was infinite in both directions. Time itself was considered
eternal, in the sense that it had existed, and would exist,
forever.
The concept of mathematical time employed
by Newton was based on the analogy between time and a geometrical
straight line and was derived from Isaac Barrow (Newton’s
predecessor in the chair of mathematics at Cambridge)[xii] who regarded time as absolute i.e.
Time does not employ motion, so far as
its absolute and intrinsic nature is concerned; not any
more than it implies rest; whether things move or are still,
whether we are sleep or awake, time pursues the even tenour
of its way. (Whitrow, 1988, p.128)
Theoretical mechanical and mathematical systems
promoted a mechanical view of the universe and soon replaced
the previous Aristotelian emphasis on substances as the
primary object of scientific investigation.
The physical sciences launched by Copernicus,
Galileo, Newton and Boyle secured a
longer and stronger hold on the cosmogony-builders than
did either their forerunners or their successors. People
still tend to treat laws of mechanics not merely as the
ideal type of scientific laws, but as, in some sense, the
ultimate laws of nature. (Ryle, 1949, p.74)
The belief in an absolute sense of time (in
industrialized societies) seems to have been reinforced
(in the late seventeenth century) with the application of
mechanical ideas by philosophers such as Descartes and the
invention of accurate mechanical clocks that could operate
uniformly and continually for years. As clocks proceeded
to operate without any need for their original designer
to intervene, the analogy of God as a creator of a non-telelogical
mechanical universe was soon made. This is illustrated
by Robert Boyle (1627-91) who thought the world was analogous
to:
A rare clock, such as may be that at Strasbourg,
where all things are so skilfully contrived, that the engine
being once set a-moving, all things proceed, according to
the artificer’s first design, and the motions of the little
statues, that at such hours perform these or those things,
do not require, like those of puppets, the peculiar interposing
of the artificer, or by any, intelligent agent employed
by him, but perform their functions upon particular occasions,
by virtue of the general and primitive contrivance of the
whole engine. (Boyle, 1686)
By the seventeenth century, the Church calendar
already emphasised the regularity of Sunday every week and
was continued by the Puritans who advocated a regular routine
of six days of work and one day of rest. The belief in
the uniformity of time was reinforced by the development
in towns of an economy based on commercial interests. The
new mercantile class soon realized that ‘time is money’
and so shifted the emphasis of time from a seasonal notion
(based on agriculture) to a daily one that emphasised regularity
and time-saving.[xiii] It’s still apparent in industrialized countries that city living seems ‘faster’
than agricultural areas. This observation is supported
by a study published in 1971 by Lowin, Hottes, Sandler &
Bornstein.[xiv] They
found that in U.S. towns with populations of less than 8000,
the subsequently described actions took longer than in a
big U.S. city (such as New York):
1.
Walking 100 feet after leaving a bank;
2.
Completing a postal transaction;
3.
Waiting for an attendant to arrive at one’s car at a petrol
station; and;
4.
Purchasing cigarettes in a drugs store.
Anecdotal evidence of the difference in the
pace of life between country and city life is illustrated
by Pirsig (1974, p.14/15) when recounting his motorcycle
journey across the Mid-West:
Paved country roads are the best... Roads
free of drive-ins and billboards are better, roads where
groves and meadows and orchards and lawns come almost to
the shoulder, where kids wave to you when you ride by, where
people look from the porches to see who it is, where when
you stop to ask directions or information the answer tends
to be longer than you want rather than short, where people
ask where you’re from and how long you’ve been riding...
The whole pace of life and personality
of the people who live along them are different. They’re
not going anywhere. They’re not too busy to be courteous.
The hereness and nowness of things is something they know
all about. It’s the others, the ones who moved to the cities
years ago and their lost offspring, who have all but forgotten
it.
This observation may involve a piece of urban
romanticism though the Industrial Revolution certainly increased
the reliance on the clock in commerce. There was the invention
of the chronometer for use at sea (to find longitude) by
John Harrison in the 1730s, a British mail coach system
based on strict time-keeping was introduced in 1784, the
railways employed Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) from the 1830s
and international Universal Time (based on GMT) became employed
from 1884. In 1839, a railway director wisely refused to
supply a compiler of railway timetables (George Bradshaw)
the times of his trains, having realized ‘it would tend
to make punctuality a sort of obligation.’[xv]
Moreover, there was a proliferation of pocket watches from
the late eighteenth century, the manufacture of cheap Swiss
watches in their millions from the 1860s, the Victorian
introduction of the idea of ‘spare time’ (as a reward for
hard work) and the requirement of workers to ‘clock in’
and to ‘clock out’. In 1850, the Nepalese ruler Jang Bahadur on
a visit to England observed that ‘Getting dressed, eating,
keeping appointments, sleeping, getting up - everything
is determined by the clock... everywhere you look, there
you see a clock. (Whitrow, 1988, p.164) It’s therefore
noticeable that modern industrialized society is dependent
on time to a greater extent than any society previously
recorded[xvi] and that an Enlightenment notion of
time still supports an Enlightenment form of work (i.e.
capitalism).
While advanced science and personal experience
may admit relativity; the practical world does not. We
are [still] regulated by the Newtonian world of timepieces.
(Gorman & Wessman, 1977, p.47)
However, this dependence on time-keeping is
not a necessary facet of human life as indicated by less-industrialized
societies. P.M. Bell reports that Ugandan children in comparison
to Western children (of a similar age) have a reduced notion
in judging duration. For instance, a two hour journey by
bus was estimated at ten minutes by some Ugandan children
while others gave a time of six hours. Moreover, though
Australian Aborigine children can read the hands of a clock
as a memory exercise, they supposedly find it hard to relate
the time they read to an actual time of the day.[xvii] It has been suggested by some anthropologists
such as La Barre, Lee and Whorf (1936, pp. 57-64) that
certain non-Western cultures (such as the Hopi Indians)
have no concepts for time (even a relational notion) though
Gorman & Wessman (1977, p.45) point out that the absence
of conceptual time in some cultures is far from established:
Certainly most, and possibly all, languages
possess time words and allow their speakers to communicate
regarding temporal features of experience. Also, context
and paralinguistic features probably would allow implicit
temporal references that might not be clearly codified in
speech. We doubt that any group could function or survive
without some degree of effective communication regarding
the temporal features of both the natural world and social
interaction.
Finally, it seems the ability of human beings
to acquire socially shared symbols and abstract relations
seems to have facilitated the conceptualization of time.
Even hunter-gathering which involved activity then rest
for relatively long stretches (not requiring precise time
measurement) must have necessitated future planning:
Many of the significant discoveries and
practices of early man clearly required foresight and planning
or indicate considerable temporal awareness and concern,
for example, tool making, fire making and tending, agriculture
and settled habitation, and burial customs. These prehistoric
practices must have been accompanied by the development
of social communication and speech, which permitted the
maintenance and transmission of cultural practices and traditions.
Language facilitates memory and enhances capacity for imagination
and planning, thereby extending time span into past and
future. (Gorman & Wessman, 1977, p.44)
Both Einstein’s and Newton’s notion of mathematical
time passes ‘equably’ and uniformly at points in space-time
that are at rest with respect to each other (e.g. the stones
at Stonehenge) though it is observed in Einstein’s theory
of general relativity of 1915[xviii] that
when points (in space-time) move at relatively different
velocities in relation to each other, then time passes at
different rates between the points (e.g. Stonehenge in relation
to a spaceship a light year away travelling in close proximity
to the speed of light).
This required abandoning the idea that
there is a universal quantity called time that all clocks
would measure. Instead, everyone would have his or her
personal time…. Einstein had overthrown two of the
absolutes of nineteenth-century science: absolute rest,
as represented by the ether,[xix]
and absolute or universal time. (Hawking, 2001, p.9/11)
As noted above, Newton’s ‘mathematical’ theory
of time considered time as absolute. Consequently, it was
thought that when bodies moved or forces acted there was
no effect on space or the rate of change though Einstein’s
theory of general relativity indicates this as false because
the curvature of space-time is affected by the distribution
of matter.[xx] In Einstein’s theory, time was no
longer an independent property but was now considered as
just one direction of a four-dimensional continuum termed
space-time. In consequence, it was realised that time (at
least, as space-time) was distorted by physical properties
such as gravity, mass and motion. As Hawking (1988, p.38)
illustrates:
Before 1915, space and time were thought
of as a fixed arena in which events took place but which
was not affected by what happened in it... The situation,
however, is quite different in the general theory of relativity.
Space and time are now dynamic quantities: when a body moves,
or a force acts, it affects the curvature of space and time
- and in turn the structure of space-time affects the way
in which bodies move and forces act.
The typical illustration employed in support
of Einstein’s relative notion of time is the flying of two
accurate clocks in opposite directions around the world.
When the clock times are compared after the flights, the
clock that has been in the plane flying east, records slightly
less time. (Hawking, 2001, p.9) Another example is provided
by Barrow (1988, p.104). This is the observation that if
the Newtonian theory of time were correct, then we would
never observe muons[xxi] on
the Earth’s surface since they are formed at an altitude
of nearly 6000 metres and in their fleeting lifetime can
only travel a fraction of this distance. However, according
to Einstein’s theory of relativity, as the muons are travelling
close to the speed of light, this 6000m distance distorts
(from the muon’s point of view) to only 270 metres. As
the muon can travel this distance before it decays, it is
therefore observed at the Earth’s surface.
It should be stressed that these counter-intuitive
aspects of relative space and time are not just illusions
or perspectives, in the way that a body appears to have
a different shape when viewed at an angle... The muons
really do reach the Earth’s surface; they would not if space
and time were absolute Newtonian concepts. (Barrow,
1988, p.104)
However, as Clark (1999) notes, possibly the
scientists on the day of the above experiment observed some
unusually long lived muons![xxii]
As elucidated above, space and time only exist
as a combined concept by postulation in the theory of general
relativity: ‘It is impossible to divide the four-dimensional
continuum into a three-dimensional spatial continuum and
a one-dimensional temporal continuum in any way that makes
sense from the objective point of view.’ (Einstein)[xxiii] Despite this, the notion of an
objective, absolute time remains the ‘common sense’ notion
as noted by Hawking (2001, p.108): ‘It is the [Newtonian]
view of time that most people and even most physicists have
at the back of their minds.’ Though the relational theory
of space-time is presently dominant in theoretical physics,
it is only more accurate than Newton’s laws of time at speeds
close to the speed of light. Moreover, Newton’s laws of
motion are considerably simpler to operate
Understanding the technicalities of the
general theory of relativity is a truly daunting task, each
separate equation is much more complicated than Newton’s
simple inverse square law and calculating anything useful
using the full theory is beyond all but the most dedicated
specialists. While the application of Newton’s
theory of gravity requires one equation to be solved, Einstein’s
theory has no less than ten, which must all be solved simultaneously.
(Coles, 2000, p.22)
In the latest physical ‘Theory of Everything’
(M-theory), the universe is possibly one of many in a ‘multi-verse’
(or to describe the theory another way, the laws of physics
are inconsistent and alter depending which area of the universe
you are situated). As such, Newtonian absolute time could
possibly be the norm – on the larger scale of things though
Hawking (2001, p. 175) does emphasise that there are significant
parts of M-theory still not understood and, presently, other
‘universes’ and their laws are just speculative. The latter
point is confirmed by Penrose (1989, p.200-01) who thinks
that ‘Theories of Everything’ should be only regarded as
‘tentative’ due to their relative lack of ‘significant experimental
support’.
Finally, the ‘Theories of Everything’ alluded
to by Hawking and other physicists are not, strictly speaking,
theories of everything as they only explain inorganic
value patterns and possibly beg the issue by employing a
physical theory in this fashion. Only a theory that can
explain all aspects of reality (i.e. the inorganic, biological,
social, intellectual and mystical) coherently could be considered
as a ‘true theory of everything’ and, as observed by chemists,
even their particular field cannot be presently reduced
to physical explanations; let alone the areas studied by
biologists, social scientists and psychologists. Hawking (2001,
p.105) argues that, in principle, the laws of quantum electrodynamics
do allow the prediction of chemical and biological patterns
though such determinism only works if (physical) information
is not irretrievably lost in cosmic phenomena such as wormholes
and black holes. According to Hawking (2001, p.126), this
is presently an open question though if confirmed would
have devastating consequences for physics:
This means that there isn’t any
measurement outside the black hole that can be predicted
with certainty: our ability to make definite [physical]
predictions would be reduced to zero. So maybe astrology
is no worse at predicting the future than the laws of science.
Even if all physical information is retrievable,
Ryle (1949, p.74-75) believes that physical laws are analogous
to the rules of chess; the rules are fixed but the games
are not pre-destined by them. For instance, a scientist
could observe and learn all the rules of chess but this
still wouldn’t provide definite predictions of how a particular
game would play out:
Physicists may one day have found the answers
to all physical questions, but not all questions are physical
questions. The laws that they have found and will find
may, in one sense of the metaphorical verb, govern everything
that happens, but they do not ordain everything that happens.
Indeed they do not ordain anything that happens. Laws of
nature are not fiats. (Ryle, 1949, p.75)
Ryle’s central line of reasoning is that the
same process (such as an orchestra playing) can be in accordance
with different types of laws that are irreducible to each
other. The laws of physics (like a chessboard) may be necessary
for biological, social and intellectual laws but are not
sufficient by themselves to explain them.
‘Change’ and ‘time’ appear to be concepts
founded in the biological development of the human being’s
brain. In prehistoric social groupings, the brain facilitated
the learning and remembering of abstract concepts such as
‘change’, ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future.’ With writing,
it became easier to distinguish past times and ages and
in the era of the Ancient Greeks, philosophers were already
wondering whether time had an independent physical existence
or was simply a mental phenomenon. With the emergence of
Newtonian physics and the construction of the first mechanical
clocks in the seventeenth century, the idea of an absolute
universal time became dominant and still remains the case
in the social arena of the world’s industrialized areas.
However, the formulation of general relativity by Einstein undermined
the Platonic idea of an absolute universal time, time becoming
just the fourth dimension of space-time which measures the
physical changes in gravity, mass and motion. This entails
that three distinct entities are now referred to by the
term ‘time’ in modern thinking. These are:
1.
Sensed time (a concept by intuition);
2.
Newton’s absolute time (a concept by postulation); and,
3.
Einstein’s space-time (also a concept by postulation).
I assume that sensed time has been, more or
less, constant since the first human beings appeared. On
the other hand, the concepts by postulation (i.e. mathematical
time) have changed since the first recorded times and, no
doubt, will continue to do so. ‘For although our awareness
of time is a product of human evolution, our ideas of time
are neither innate nor automatically learned but are intellectual
constructions that result from experience and action.’ (Whitrow,
1988, p.5-6) The provisional nature of our theories of
time is supported by Hawking (1988, p.11):
Any physical theory is always provisional,
in the sense that it is only a hypothesis: you can never
prove it. No matter how many times the results of an experiment
agree with some theory, you can never be sure that the next
time the result will not contradict the theory.
And tends to support Pirsig’s caution about
assigning anything objective as an absolute reality independent
from any observer.
Classical scientific reality keeps changing
all the time as scientists keep discovering new conceptual
explanations. Every year they have to say ‘Well,
last year we thought it was this way, but now we know what
it is really like.’ …even when it is explained to them
carefully the SOM people are so inured to their way of thinking
that they still don’t understand. I had one letter asking,
‘On the day before Newton was born did apples
obey the law of gravity?’ I think he thought he had me
trapped.
I had to answer him, ‘No. Apples did not
follow the law of gravity on the day before Newton was
born. On that day apples just fell.’ (Pirsig, 1997d)
If evolution is thought of as a process of
growth then the concept of change is certainly implied by
this and seems relatively straightforward. Nevertheless,
it’s not immediately obvious which notion of time should
be employed if evolution is defined as ‘biological change
over time.’ Possibly, the answer lies with Einstein who
only allows space-time to have a non-mental existence.
As such, evolution is possibly more precisely defined as
‘change within a segment of space-time’ (rather than just
‘change over time’). Such a revision in definition points
to the difficulties that arise when a concept (and especially
a concept by postulation) is thought to be absolute as Pirsig
(1998d) points out (echoing Parmenides):
According to the Metaphysics of Quality,
time and change did NOT act to evolve the static universe.
Only Dynamic Quality did this. ‘Time’ and ‘change’ are
primary concepts used to describe this evolution but they
do not cause evolution any more than Newton’s
law of gravity causes the earth to stick together.
When Pirsig states that ‘only Dynamic Quality
evolved the static universe’, this echoes Popper’s (1990,
p.21) theory of propensities in that it’s ‘not the kicks
from the back, from the past, that impel us but the
attraction, the lure of the future and its competing possibilities,
that… keeps life – and, indeed, the world – unfolding.’
In addition, it seems that the newer static levels (such
as the intellectual) seem more responsive to the open-ended
‘possibilities’ of Dynamic Quality. The inorganic patterns
take millions of years to substantially change, biological
patterns thousands of years, social patterns hundreds of
years and ideas only decades if not minutes. This would
imply that the increase of freedom related with Dynamic
Quality will become even more extended as the intellectual
patterns gain control in manipulating the other levels.
Finally, it is worth noting that though this increased freedom
would have benefits, it would also entail a risk towards
degeneracy:
Static quality patterns are dead when they
are exclusive, when they demand blind obedience and suppress
Dynamic change. But static patterns, nevertheless, provide
a necessary stabilizing force to protect Dynamic progress
from degeneration. Although Dynamic Quality, the Quality
of freedom, creates this world in which we live, these patterns
of static quality, the quality of order, preserve our world…
A tension between these two forces is needed to continue
the evolution of life. (Pirsig, 1991, p.124-25)
